Civil Society and Cybersurveillance by Wright, Andrew McCanse
Arkansas Law Review
Volume 70 | Number 3 Article 6
December 2017
Civil Society and Cybersurveillance
Andrew McCanse Wright
Savannah Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arkansas Law Review by an
authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew M. Wright, Civil Society and Cybersurveillance, 70 Ark. L. Rev. 745 (2017).
Available at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol70/iss3/6
CIVIL SOCIETY AND CYBERSURVEILLANCE 
Andrew McCanse Wright* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is no such thing as benign surveillance.1  It always 
comes with costs because of the chill it visits upon conduct, 
education, associations, and expression.2  Government 
surveillance has been magnified by cybersurveillance3 in the 
Digital Age4 to a degree unimaginable by the Founders of the 
United States of America.5  The various National Security 
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1.  Surveillance is commonly associated with law enforcement.  See, e.g., Surveillance,
CAMBRIDGE ACADEMIC CONTENT DICTIONARY (1st ed. 2009) (defining “surveillance” as 
“the act of watching a person or a place, especially a person believed to be involved with 
criminal activity or a place where criminals gather”).  While that connotation has relevance 
to this essay, I use “surveillance” to refer to “the gathering and analysis of information in the 
pursuit of various finalities—in particular, preventing certain risks, orienting human 
behaviors and, in the event of a problem, locating the persons responsible.”  Monica 
Tremblay, Cyber-Surveillance, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION (L. Côté & J.-F. Savard eds., online ed. 2012), 
http://www.dictionnaire.enap.ca/dictionnaire/docs/definitions/definitions_anglais/cyber_sur
veillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/62YN-QUM5]; see also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE 
STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2007) (defining surveillance as “the focused, systematic and 
routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or 
direction”). 
2. Surveillance provides public and private benefits as well, but the fact that
observation affects those aware of its potential is manifest.  See infra Part V. 
3. I use the term “cybersurveillance” as defined in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of
Public Administration because it encompasses technical platforms beyond the Internet: “a 
mechanism for the surveillance of persons, objects or processes that is based on new 
technologies and that is operated from and on data networks, such as the Internet.” 
Tremblay, supra note 1.   
4. I refer to the “Digital Age,” also called the Information Age, as the time period
starting in the 1970s and defined by the introduction of the personal computer and subsequent 
technology that allows the rapid and massive storage and transfer of information in digital 
form.  See Digital Age, CAMBRIDGE BUSINESS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2011). 
5. While some of these observations would apply to the European Union, the
Commonwealth, and other comparative contexts, I address these questions through the lens 
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Agency (NSA) telephone and internet surveillance programs that 
have come to light6 shocked the public as a matter of scale and 
audacity.7  There has also been a raging debate about government 
access to counter-surveillance encryption technology.8 
However, the entry of government cybersurveillance into the 
daily routines of life may pose an even greater concern.  The 
unfolding technological revolution profoundly alters human 
relations to governments, business entities, civic institutions, and 
social associations.9  As the world becomes more interconnected, 
national security threats can grow domestically, cross physical 
borders, or emanate from digital space itself.10  At the same time, 
government surveillance-capacity expansion has been 
geometric.11  All of these developments threaten private spaces 
of the American constitutional system. 
6. See LUKE HARDING, THE SNOWDEN FILES: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE WORLD’S 
MOST WANTED MAN 10-11 (2014); Dustin Volz, Everything We Learned from Edward 
Snowden in 2013, NAT’L J. (Dec. 31, 2013).  For a pre-Snowden perspective, see Neal Katyal 
& Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance 
Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1032-35 (2008) (outlining public 
reporting about the NSA surveillance program). 
7. As the invitation to the 2016 Privacy Forum indicates: “[T]he size of the NSA
surveillance and collection program was absolutely staggering, with the NSA spending some  
$10.8 billion per year and maintaining a staff of some 35,000 employees.”  Russel L. Weaver 
& Laurence Boissier, Governmental Transparency and Openness in a Digital Era: A U.S. 
Perspective, 2 INT’L J. DIGITAL & DATA L. 59, 69 (2016) (footnotes omitted)     (discussing 
the government’s large cybersurveillance operation  and  how  if not  for   Edward Snowden  
“the American  people  might  never have  known  about  [its]  size”).        
8. Compare James B. Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau Investigation, Going Dark: Are
Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?, Remarks at the Brookings 
Institution (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-
privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course [https://perma.cc/4GS9-2WEG] (arguing to 
extend to emerging technologies those legal requirements for telecommunications carriers 
and broadband providers to build interception capabilities into their networks for court-
ordered surveillance), with Rob Price, Tim Cook’s Internal Memo to All Apple Employees on 
the Company’s Fight Against the FBI, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2016, 7:14 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/tim-cook-apple-fbi-hack-iphone-san-bernardino-memo-
2016-2 [https://perma.cc/5ECL-H6VX] (thanking employees for supporting Apple’s 
opposition to the FBI’s request to order a workaround of the encryption on the San 
Bernardino terrorism suspect’s iPhones because “we use encryption to protect our 
customers—whose data is under siege”).  
9. See infra Part VI.
10. KRISTIN FINKLEA & CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. 
NO. R42547, CYBERCRIME: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AND U.S. LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 8 (2015).   
11. See infra Part VI.
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and modes that are essential to self-government.12 
In this essay, I argue that it would be productive to reverse 
prevailing thought about privacy and government surveillance. 
Traditional legal analysis calls on courts and policy makers to 
look to specific provisions of governmental charters and laws to 
address the permissibility of a particular government surveillance 
effort.13  Rather, courts and policy makers would benefit from 
assessing the freedom from surveillance required to preserve an 
empowered democratic citizenry and working backwards to 
assess whether a particular government surveillance effort stifles 
that freedom. 
The United States was established as a liberal democratic 
republic.14  One of the essential features of the American political 
scheme is a civil society, which presupposes “a social sphere 
separate from both the state and the market.”15  It requires 
apartness from the government.  That separation from the 
government, which I will call the civil preserve,16 is a necessary 
feature for both legitimate government (i.e., the consent of the 
governed) as well as democratic self-government (i.e., 
empowered citizens).  Beyond the sequential approach of classic 
Fourth Amendment analysis,17 civil society theory raises other 
12.  See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1264, 1267-68 (2004).  
13. Id. at 1267, 1269-76.
14. See PERRY KELLY, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW: LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY, TRADE, AND THE NEW MEDIA 57 (2011) (describing the “early American start 
as an avowedly liberal democratic republic”).  The United States is “liberal” in that it protects 
civil liberties and political freedom by means of the rule of law and constitutional limitation, 
“democratic” in that American citizens elect their leaders, and “republican” in that policy 
decisions are primarily made by elected leaders.  See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). 
15.  ALISON MACK ET AL., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., GLOBAL HEALTH 
RISK FRAMEWORK: GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL HEALTH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 112 
(2016).  For a more fulsome discussion of various definitions and underpinnings of civil 
society theory, see Benny D. Setianto, Somewhere in Between: Conceptualizing Civil 
Society, 10 INT’L J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 109, 110, 113-17 (2007).  
16. The term “civil preserve” has been used to denote the area of authority held
exclusively by the President of the United States in relation to subordinate military 
commanders.  See, e.g., JAMES A. RAWLEY, TURNING POINTS OF THE CIVIL WAR 173-74 
(New Bison Books ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 1989) (1966) (describing politics as part of “the 
civil preserve of the President, not to be poached on by a general”).  I appropriate the term 
as used differently in this essay but adopt the concept of an area not to be encroached upon. 
17. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 311, 315-16 (2012) (“The sequential approach is not merely a minor aspect of Fourth 
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fundamental questions.18  What kind of citizen do we need?  What 
zone of autonomy is necessary to build that kind of citizen?  In a 
more aggregate sense, what space is required to create private 
associations that build the political culture necessary for 
government by the people? 
Benjamin Franklin famously wrote:  “Those who would give 
up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve 
neither Liberty nor Safety.”19  The civil preserve consists of 
essential liberty and privacy.  Protection of the civil preserve 
should be the paramount limitation on public interests in 
cybersurveillance as a means of countering criminal activity and 
national security threats.  At first blush, the civil preserve does 
not readily lend itself to practical judicial processes.  But an 
understanding of its essence, attributes, and limitations should be 
a central concern to academics, policy makers, and judges. 
II. CIVIL SOCIETY THEORY
Civil society is a defining feature of the American liberal 
democratic republic.20  In one sense, the American system can be 
defined in the negative.  The theory divides the world into public 
and private spaces, with a “society” in the middle that mediates 
between the public and private spheres.  As one commentator 
notes: 
[C]ivil society denotes those collectivities, or those 
collective actions and norms, which are outside of and 
autonomous from the state, being also neither the property 
of the ‘private sphere’ (of family life) or of the economy 
(whether or not the economy is defined as ‘private’).  Civil 
Amendment doctrine.  Rather, it forms the foundation of existing search and seizure 
analysis.”). 
18. See infra Part II.
19. CARLA J. MULFORD, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE ENDS OF EMPIRE 178 (2015) 
(observing that Franklin’s quotation “has consonance with some of the most important 
articulations about liberty and governance in early modern liberal expression”). But see 
Benjamin Wittes, What Ben Franklin Really Said, LAWFARE (July 15, 2011,  
6:53 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ben-franklin-really-said#.UvvR12RDtZs 
[https://perma.cc/6H43-QRTL] (“In other words, the ‘essential liberty’ to which Franklin 
referred was thus not what we would think of today as civil liberties but, rather, the right of 
self-governance of a legislature in the interests of collective security.”).  
20. Gideon B. Baker, Civil Society and Democratisation Theory: An Inter-Regional
Comparison 1 (Sept. 1998) (unpublished D. Phil. dissertation, University of Leeds), 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43716.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KE2-4ARE].  
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society is therefore at once public and private—‘public’ in 
the sense that human association always has implications for 
the wider community, placing an individual in a particular 
relation to others and to the whole; and ‘private’ in that it 
falls outside of the formal political sphere where publicly 
binding decisions are made.  Of course, both the family and 
the economy also posses [sic] these characteristics, yet civil 
society is defined apart from these constructs because it is in 
some ways (or ideally) a realm of voluntary association.21  
It is in this sense that a “society” dwells in that middle space. 
These voluntary associations are mediating institutions upon 
which the broader American political system relies.22  Mediating 
institutions help create the attributes necessary for democratic 
citizenship.23 
The space reserved for people apart from government is 
apparent when compared to the totalitarian theory24 of 
Communism guiding the Democratic People’s Republic of 
21. Id. at 20; see also Michael W. Foley & Bob Edwards, Beyond Tocqueville: Civil
Society and Social Capital in Comparative Perspective, 42 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 5, 
6 (1998) (tracing the modern usage of the term “civil society” to “the 18th-century effort to 
wrest a social space within which emerging and preexisting types of associations could 
pursue their own ends relatively free from the absolutizing pretensions of both monarchists 
and radical republicans”). 
22. See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1479, 1490 (1994) (characterizing synagogues, churches, temples, families, and 
voluntary community and civic associations as “mediating institutions [that] may truly 
mediate between the private individual and the state”) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 310-34 (Henry Reeve, trans., Vintage Books 1945) (1835)). 
23. See Foley & Edwards, supra note 21, at 11-12 (theorizing that civil society’s
mediating institutions perform socialization functions, quasi-public functions, and 
representative functions for civic culture). 
24.  A totalitarian government recognizes no limits to its power and no autonomy in its 
populace.  It claims not just a monopoly on political power, but the regulation of all cultural, 
religious, and economic elements of society.  Giovanni Amendola first articulated “total” 
state power as a description of Italian Fascism.  See RICHARD PIPES, RUSSIA UNDER THE 
BOLSHEVIK REGIME 243 (1993).  On his path to Nazism, a Weimar Republic jurist coined 
the term Totalstaat.  See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 22 (George 
Schwab trans., Rutgers Univ. Press 1976) (1932); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS 
OF TOTALITARIANISM 307-11 (new ed. 1973) (describing ideology as the engine and 
organizing principle of the totalitarian regime). 
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Korea25 or the theocracy model26 aspired to by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.27  The United States was formed on a theory of 
consent of the governed rather than a claim of divine mandate.28  
America’s Founders radically departed from the ancien régime by 
conferring government legitimacy by means of a voting 
franchise.29  Since that time, the United States has extended those 
rights, albeit fitfully, to freedmen, people who could not afford a 
25. Changyong Choi, “Everyday Politics” in North Korea, 72 J. ASIAN STUD. 655,
656 (2013) (“Many studies have focused on North Korea as a socialist state and the fact that 
its political system is based on highly structured totalitarianism, where collective rules and 
political and ideological solidarity are emphasized over individual activities.”) (citations 
omitted). 
26. In a theocracy, “God is recognized as the immediate ruler and His laws are taken
as the legal code of the community and are expounded and administered by holy men as His 
agents.”  S.E.F., Theocracy, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS 610 (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 1987).  A theocracy can be defined as a totalitarian 
state in which the governing ideology is the concept of one true religion that regulates 
political, cultural, and economic elements of society.  See Mario Ferrero, The Rise and 
Demise of Theocracy: Theory and Some Evidence, 156 PUB. CHOICE 723, 723-24 
(2013)(“Theocracy literally means government by God . . . .  [T]he word in its strict sense is 
usually understood to mean government by a clergy, or a self-appointed group who claim to 
speak and act on God’s behalf.”). 
27. See H. E. Chehabi, Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic is the Islamic
Republic?, 120 DAEDALUS 69, 72-74 (1991) (detailing Ayatollah Khameini’s fitful 
revolution project to subsume Iran’s political, legal, social and economic life under the 
theocratic control of clerics).  Iran’s political regime is particularly complicated, with 
multiple power centers and some democratic processes that dilute the Ayatollah’s theocratic 
claims.  See Stephen C. Fairbanks, Theocracy Versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political 
Parties, 52 MIDDLE EAST J. 17, 31 (1998) (“Khatami’s 20 million voters ushered in a 
principle of people’s government and a demand for the institutions of civil society.  Those 
ideas are difficult to reconcile with theocracy . . . .”). 
28. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (declaring “We the People . . . ordain[ed] and establish[ed]”
the U.S. Constitution).  “The first three words of the preamble to the Constitution suggest 
one element unique to the American Revolution: its outcome was a government created by 
the people, not one existing independently of them . . . .”  Donald L. Doernberg, “We the 
People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge 
Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 52 (1985) (footnote omitted); see also JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (Belknap Press rev. ed. 1999) (1971) (arguing the 
legitimacy of a social contract depends on free and rational choice by all individuals in the 
original position, in which each person’s preferences are separated by a “veil of ignorance”); 
Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and 
Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 847-80 (1985) (summarizing the various 
social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacque Rousseau, and 
Immanuel Kant that a social contract is a set of collectively binding social arrangements 
predicated on consent of those governed by it).  
29. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 8-9 (2000).  
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poll tax, women, and those eighteen years old.30  Notwithstanding 
more recent conservative efforts to curtail ballot access31 and 
uneven Supreme Court election law jurisprudence,32 voting 
remains central to the legitimacy of American government. 
The American model requires a dedicated private sphere and 
a robust civil society.  A civil preserve is essential to create the 
space necessary to participate in mediating institutions and 
maintain the tools of self-government.  However, the ruthless 
efficiency and expansion of cybersurveillance often intrudes upon 
behavior reflecting private conscience and voluntary 
association.33 
III. THE CIVIL PRESERVE
A civil preserve is defined by the privacy and liberty that 
allow for autonomy required of citizens in a system of self-
government.  Citizens in a liberal democratic republic have 
governing responsibilities.34  Formally, they may vote, petition 
the government, determine probable cause, and find legal facts.35  
However, a polity must create the conditions necessary for a 
30. See Kenneth T. Walsh, Voting Rights Still a Hot-Button Issue, U.S. NEWS (Aug.
4, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/04/voting-rights-still-
a-political-issue-50-years-later [https://perma.cc/PL5N-995u].   
31. See William D. Hicks et al., A Principle or a Strategy? Voter Identification Laws
and Partisan Competition in the American States, 68 POL. RES. Q. 18, 19-21 (2015) (finding 
that Republican-controlled legislatures strongly influence the adoption of voter identification 
laws in electorally competitive states as a partisan countermeasure to a demographically 
declining electoral coalition); see also Ari Berman, The GOP War on Voting, ROLLING 
STONE (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-gop-war-on-voting-
20110830 [https://perma.cc/C5U5-4Z4K] (discussing efforts by prominent conservatives, 
including Paul Weyrich, David Koch, Charles Koch, to push election reforms that restrict 
voter access for partisan gain). 
32. Joshua A. Douglas, A Pivotal Moment for Election Law, 104 KY. L.J. 547, 559
(2016) (“Reforming the Court’s election law jurisprudence could result in a better 
functioning democratic process; entrenching or extending harmful precedents will impede 
that goal.”). 
33. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Disclosed in
[GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination 
to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS 
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the 
union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”). 
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populace to effectively fulfill those formal functions. 
Much has been written about the process of citizen creation 
since Alexis de Tocqueville published his findings in Democracy 
in America,36 including the importance of mediating institutions 
and the role of enlightened self-interest.37  These are the building 
blocks of the American system, and they rely on autonomous and 
empowered citizens.  Citizens need to educate themselves about 
issues because it is critical for citizens to cast votes on matters of 
public importance.  The populace needs space to develop private 
conscience and public virtues.  Citizens need to be able to 
inculcate those values in their children and charges.  They must 
rely on a free flow of information in a marketplace of ideas that 
sits apart from government-issued messages.  There must be room 
for brainstorms and dissent.  In order to organize politically, 
people need freedom to associate and build coalitions.  They need 
to be able to communicate messages that contradict, and even 
disdain, government policy.  At the same time, citizens must 
observe the rule of law and develop a healthy respect for 
government authority.  They respect authority by adhering to the 
rule of law in deference to its legitimacy.38  In sum, citizens need 
to be legally obedient but politically and culturally autonomous. 
The civil preserve is analogous to the zone of branch 
autonomy required to perform essential functions that are the 
touchstone of a functionalist’s approach to separation of 
powers.39 The civil preserve constitutes the autonomous zone for 
36. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer
& Max Lerner eds., George Lawrence, trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835). 
37. Tocqueville believed American participation in voluntary associations organized
around common interests or political issues created an enlightened self-interest.  He argued 
they had a transformational effect: “At first it is of necessity that men attend to the public 
interest, afterward by choice.  What had been calculation becomes instinct.  By dint of 
working for the good of his fellow citizens, he in the end acquires a habit and taste for serving 
them.”  Id. at 484. 
38. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (emphasizing 
empirical evidence that legitimacy, when compared to deterrence, is a salient motivator of 
law obedience).  
39. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 611 (2001) (noting the view that “the flexibility . . . 
evaporates if the arrangement threatens ‘core’ functions”); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and 
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (observing “a functional approach . . . stresses core 
function and relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not 
threatened”).  
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which intrusion stifles the core functions of citizenship.  Thus, 
privacy is both an end and a means.40  Some degree of privacy is 
a basic human right.41  But preservation of a private sphere is also 
an essential ingredient in democracy.42  In his book, Privacy 
Revisited, Professor Ronald Krotoszynksi makes compelling 
observations about the essential relation between democracy and 
privacy.43  Without unsurveilled spaces for thoughts, 
associations, and communications, the people lose their 
deliberative capacity and institutional independence. 
How much privacy do we need to create the apartness 
necessary to create democratic stewardship of the state rather than 
subservience to it?  It is a vexing question that is not readily 
susceptible to judicial standards.  However, that does not mean 
the civil preserve is wholly unknowable.  While the civil preserve 
is not a formal part of American constitutional doctrine, U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions occasionally reference interests that are 
features of it.44  Moreover, while the Bill of Rights and Civil War 
amendments provide a great deal of protection for the civil 
preserve, they are distinct and not coextensive with it. 
IV. THE CIVIL PRESERVE AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 
The choice to establish the United States as a liberal 
democratic republic sounding in civil society and ordered liberty 
contemplates the civil preserve.  Perhaps the civil preserve is 
included among natural rights and therefore preexisted the 
40. For a thoughtful treatment of the bundle of concepts associated with privacy, see
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008).  As David Pozen notes, privacy 
interests not only clash with public interests, but also often sit in dynamic tension with other 
privacy interests.  See David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 
221-24 (2016) (citations omitted).  
41. James Griffin, The Human Right to Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 697, 700 
(2007) (“Without privacy, autonomy is threatened.”). 
42.  See Edward F. Ryan, Privacy, Orthodoxy and Democracy, 51 CAN. B. REV. 84, 85 
(1973).  
43. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNKSI, JR., PRIVACY REVISITED: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE 175 (2016) (“If speech is integral to democracy and, in 
turn, privacy in the form of intellectual freedom is integral to speech, then privacy constitutes 
a necessary condition for the maintenance of democratic self-government.”). 
44. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (analyzing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and finding that Government committed an unlawful search when 
it attached a tracking device to Jones’s car).   
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Constitution.  After all, the American legal canon begins with the 
Declaration of Independence’s “self-evident” truth that people are 
“endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . .”45  
Perhaps the civil preserve was implied by the scheme created 
when “We the People of the United States” ordained and 
established the Constitution.46  Maybe the civil preserve is among 
those rights the Ninth Amendment reminds us are “retained by 
the people.”47  As Justice Goldberg concluded in his Griswold v. 
Connecticut48 concurring opinion, “[t]he language and history of 
the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution 
believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected 
from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those 
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight 
constitutional amendments.”49  Under any of these authorities, a 
civil preserve is a priori to the Bill of Rights.50 
It is one thing to acknowledge the existence and significance 
of a civil preserve.  It is quite another to provide meaningful 
standards cognizable to legal processes operating in the real 
world.51  For the most part, the text and legal doctrine of specific 
constitutional provisions will do the work.  However, there are 
areas in which structural limitations and the Bill of Rights may be 
insufficient.  Such potentialities are magnified in the context of 
cybersurveillance in the Digital Age.52 
Originally, the Federalist Founders opposed the need for a 
Bill of Rights.  In part, they believed the democratic process 
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
46. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Louis Michael Seidman, Our
Unsettled Ninth Amendment: An Essay on Unenumerated Rights and the Impossibility of 
Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2140 (2010) (“Although [the Ninth Amendment’s] scope 
was limited to the federal government, its intention and effect were to protect individual 
rights within that scope.”).  But see Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 228 (1983) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment “neither 
creates new rights nor alters the status of pre-existing rights” but rather “provides that the 
individual rights contained in state law are to continue in force under the Constitution until 
modified or eliminated . . . .”); see also id. at 243 (stating “[u]nenumerated rights were not 
federal rights”).  
50. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
51. “The varieties and uncertainties of definition, of course, trouble also attempts to
locate privacy in law.”  Louis Henken, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 
1419 (1974). 
52. See infra Part VI.
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would safeguard liberty and privacy interests.53  Additionally, 
they believed the structural limitations established by a system of 
separated powers and federalism would limit the federal 
encroachment on those essential citizen functions,54 here defined 
as the civil preserve.  However, the politics of national security 
and the technological pressures of the Digital Age do not seem to 
be halting the massive expansion of cybersurveillance vis-à-vis 
the civil preserve.55 
Of course, the Bill of Rights, as extended by the Civil War 
Amendments, establishes civil liberties that protect aspects of the 
civil preserve in both rationale and function.56  The First 
(expressive, associational, and religious freedom), Third (soldier-
quartering prohibition), Fourth (search and seizure protections), 
Fifth (substantive due process and self-incrimination prohibition), 
Eighth (punishment limitations), and Fourteenth (due process and 
incorporation of other provisions to states) Amendments all 
contain limitations on government power that, collectively, help 
protect the integrity of the civil preserve.57  However, the civil 
preserve is inadequately protected by the sum of these 
constitutional provisions.  The daylight between constitutional 
provisions and the civil preserve is only exacerbated by Big Data 
in the Digital Age. 
The Fourth Amendment is the natural and primary locus of 
legal challenges to government cybersurveillance.  In the seminal 
case, Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard.58  One of the big problems with American constitutional 
law regarding the Fourth Amendment is the vulnerability of its 
reasonable expectation of privacy formulation to a descriptive 
rather than normative approach.  Ever since Katz, courts have 
53. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing a bill of rights has
“no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and 
executed by their immediate representatives and servants”). 
54. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 5
(5th ed. 2015) (noting that some attribute the absence of an “elaborate statement of individual 
rights in the Constitution” as originally ratified was due to the framers believing it was 
“unnecessary because rights were adequately protected by the limitations on power of the 
national government.”). 
55. See infra Part VI.
56. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
57. See id.
58. 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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struggled with the subjective and objective components of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that society will recognize.59  If 
one were to ask millennial law students whether they believe all 
their emails and social media are being monitored, many would 
say “probably.”  Those diminished privacy expectations are not 
unfounded.60  A descriptive view of reasonableness would 
suggest that the reality of surveillance shrinks society’s Fourth 
Amendment expectations.   
Civil society theory counsels for a Fourth Amendment with 
normative content grounded in democratic notions of ordered 
liberty.61  While the Fourth Amendment surely applies to privacy 
interests beyond those essential for civil society, the 
reasonableness of one’s expectation of privacy must be made in 
reference to whether the government intrusion pierces the civil 
preserve.  Under this view, Fourth Amendment protections do not 
constrict based on real world experience or technological 
capacity, but rather the civil preserve acts as a halo around the 
citizen that maintains its integrity in each new technological 
context. 
The third-party doctrine vastly expands the reach of 
government cybersurveillance in the Digital Age.62  Human 
interaction with technology is becoming ever more dynamic and 
59. Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment and Technologically Based
Surveillance, 48 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 231, 237 (2015) (“Although the Court has rendered some 
post-Katz technology decisions that are privacy protective, the general thrust of the Court’s 
jurisprudence has been largely unproductive.”).   
60.  See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 426-29 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(holding that obtaining historical-cell-site-location information from a Defendant’s cell-
phone provider was not a Fourth Amendment search under the third-party doctrine); United 
States v. De L’Isle, 825 F.3d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding police review of magnetic-
strip information from the back of credit card does not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 
1313-19 (2012) (outlining the “Death of Privacy” under the headings “The One Device,” 
“The Cloud,” “The Social,” “Big Data,” and “The Surveillance Society”). Ellen Nakashima, 
FBI Wants Access to Internet Browser History Without a Warrant in Terrorism and Spy 
Cases, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-
security/fbi-wants-access-to-internet-browser-history-without-a-warrant-in-terrorism-and-
spy-cases/2016/06/06/2d257328-2c0d-11e6-9de3-6e6e7a14000c_story.html?utm_term=. 
a009579c170a [https://perma.cc/28Q2-7CSQ].  
61.  See generally Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 303 (2010) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment, rather than merely a criminal 
procedure regulation, is designed to protect political liberty).  
62. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. R43586, THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 7 (2014).  
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central.63  Convenience and sales discounts create incentives for 
people to provide massive amounts of information to businesses 
and service providers.64  In turn, those entities create enormous 
commercial databanks that enable them to store, sell, and trade 
customer information.65  Third-party doctrine allows the 
government to obtain all of that information without a warrant. 
While customers may “voluntarily” provide commercial entities 
with personal information, it is unlikely they consider whether 
that information will be provided to the government without 
giving them an opportunity to object.  Under prevailing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, a person does not have an enforceable 
privacy interest in information provided to third-party vendors.66  
Concerns about cybersurveillance in the Digital Age motivated 
Justice Sotomayor to suggest that “it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.”67  Narrowing the third-party doctrine to construe 
government collection of nonpublic commercial transaction data 
as searches requiring warrants supported by probable cause would 
add prophylaxis for the civil preserve.68 
63. See Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, KURZWEIL ACCELERATING
INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 7, 2001), http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns 
[https://perma.cc/STX8-WFUB].   
64. See Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-
Snowden Era, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/  
[https://perma.cc/Y4TL-UB7K].   
65. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the
Indefinite Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 435 (2014) (“While businesses 
have legitimate reasons to use [customer] data in their day-to-day operations . . . [c]onsumer-
oriented legislation should prevent indiscriminate capitalization of data initially divulged for 
specific transactions . . . .”).  
66. See generally  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding government
collection of pen register information from a telephone company does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily furnished to a third party). 
67.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (citing 
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
68. The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to revisit third-party doctrine in
Carpenter v. United States during its October 2017 Term. 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402).  In Carpenter, the FBI, without a 
warrant, obtained robbery suspects’ historical-geolocational information derived from cell 
phone-to-tower data transmissions, called cell-site-location information or CLSI.  Id. at 884-
85. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the FBI’s conduct
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search.” 
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Debate over the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment69 
might capture the distinction between the privacy interests of the 
Fourth Amendment and those of the civil preserve.  In traditional 
Fourth Amendment analysis, courts analyze each act alleged to 
be a search in isolation.70  Each challenged act is either a Fourth 
Amendment search or is not, and each search is either reasonable 
or not.71  However, under a mosaic theory, a series of government 
acts of surveillance would be analyzed as a whole to determine 
whether it reaches a tipping point that would trigger a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and thus be deemed a search.72 
Orin Kerr criticizes the mosaic theory as a dramatic 
departure from traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, a 
complication for lower courts to apply and implement in a 
principled manner, and a disincentive to enact statutory privacy 
regulations.73  As D.C. Circuit Judge Sentelle put it in the Jones 
run-up to the Supreme Court:  “The sum of an infinite number of 
zero-value parts is also zero.”74  While Kerr’s critique may carry 
the day as a Fourth Amendment matter, government information 
mosaics could gravely imperil the civil preserve. 
V.  THE SURVEILLANCE DISTORTION EFFECT 
From devout faith in an omniscient God75 to the playful 
69. See generally Kerr, supra note 17.
70. Id. at 315-16.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 313 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 n.* (D.C. Cir.
2010) (discussing how the court “analyz[ed] “police actions over time”). 
73. See id. at 314-315.
74. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting). 
75. All three major monotheistic religions embrace an all-knowing and watchful
conception of God.  The Holy Bible contains numerous such verses.  See, e.g., Job 34:21 
(New American Standard) (“For His eyes are upon the ways of a man, And He sees all his 
steps.”); Matthew 6:4 (New American Standard) (“[A]nd your Father who sees what is done 
in secret will reward you.”); 1 Chronicles 28:9 (New American Standard) (“[F]or the Lord 
searches all hearts, and understands every intent of the thoughts.”).  The Hebrew Scriptures 
informing the Jewish faith call the Lord the “God of knowledge” (El De’ot) in 1 Samuel 2:3 
(New American Standard) and the “Lord Who Sees (“Adonai Yireh”) in Genesis 22:14 (Tree 
of Life).  In Islam, an Arabic moniker for God is “Al-’Aleem, the ‘“All-Knowing.’” See 
Surah al-An’aam 6:59 (“And with Him are the keys of the unseen; none knows them except 
Him. And He knows what is on the land and in the sea. Not a leaf falls but that He knows 
it.”).  
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childrearing benefit of an ever-watchful Santa Claus,76 Western 
societies have presumed that knowledge of observation affects the 
behavior of the observed.  Behavior is most acutely affected 
where imminent consequences will flow from the observer’s 
knowledge of the target’s disfavored conduct.  Surveillance is 
often designed to deter conduct by means of a direct nexus to 
consequences.  English philosopher Jeremy Bentham designed 
the infamous Panopticon as a jailing facility calculated to regulate 
inmate behavior by threat of surveillance and sanction.77  Some 
have argued that only the specific threat of retaliation creates a 
chilling effect grounded in surveillance.78 
However, knowledge of observation, even where 
consequences are more remote, can still have a distorting effect 
on autonomy essential to civil society.  Professor Krotoszynski 
observed:  “The specter of ‘Big Brother’ watching will 
undoubtedly have profound implications for the exercise of 
expressive freedoms—indeed for the very idea of democracy 
itself.”79  Ubiquitous surveillance causes distortion effects that 
could threaten the civil preserve.80  It could chill expression, 
research, and associations necessary to maintain popular 
governance.81  Surveillance could also adversely affect viewpoint 
76. See JOHN FREDERICK COOTS & HAVEN GILLESPIE, SANTA CLAUS IS COMING TO 
TOWN (1934) (“He sees you when you’re sleepin’; He knows when you’re awake; He knows 
when you’ve been bad or good; So be good for goodness sake.”). 
77. See generally Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon, or, The Inspection-House, in  4 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37-172 (John Bowring ed., 1787).  It was designed as a circle 
by which numerous inmates could be seen by one jailer.  While the jailer couldn’t monitor 
all the inmates at once, the inmates could not observe the jailer’s attention.  Therefore, the 
chilling effect of potential surveillance generated penal efficiency.  Bentham presented it as 
“[a] new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example 
. . . .”  Id. at 39. 
78. See Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First
Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 
466 (2015) (noting that some commentators “evince skepticism over the effects of 
surveillance, and suggest that chilling occurs only in response to specific threats of 
retaliation”). 
79. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconciling Privacy and Speech in the Era of Big
Data: A Comparative Legal Analysis, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1279, 1287 (2015) (footnote 
omitted). 
80. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 
1935 (2013).  
81. See id. (inviting us to “consider surveillance of people when they are thinking,
reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their minds about political and 
social issues”).  Richards goes on to suggest that information derived from surveillance may 
be used to exert power through blackmail, manipulation, and discrimination.  See id. at 1952-
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diversity by creating a conformity effect to a degree dangerous to 
democratic governance.82  Thus, there is a premium on ensuring 
that the scope and intrusiveness of surveillance does not so 
pervade society as to pierce the civil preserve. 
VI. CYBERSURVEILLANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
In 1971, Justice Douglas declared:  “Electronic surveillance 
is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.”83  That case 
dealt with a motion-to-suppress and testimony by law 
enforcement obtained by surreptitious radio transmissions and 
eavesdropping of conversations between the defendant and a 
government informant.84  Modern cybersurveillance would be 
unrecognizable to Justice Douglas in both sophistication and 
prevalence. 
More recently, Justice Sotomayor observed the magnitude of 
change in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones85: 
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.  And the 
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that 
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.  The 
net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a 
relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate 
information about any person whom the Government, in its 
unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society.”86 
She raises the specter of cybersurveillance as a threat that could 
disrupt the relation between citizen and government. 
58. The government or other actors may use surveillance-derived power to stifle healthy
political dissent.  Id. at 1953. 
82. See Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 78, at 467 (arguing that surveillance retards
the development of minority views and promotes conformity with majority views). 
83. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 746-47.
85. 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012).  There, the Court held that the warrantless attachment
and monitoring of a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle used by a 
suspect violated the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 404.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion relied 
on the physical intrusion of the device as the primary rationale, resurrecting the pre-Katz 
Fourth Amendment doctrine grounded in trespass rather than a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  See id. at 407-10. 
86. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 
F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum J., concurring)). 
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Seismic changes threaten to shake democratic foundations. 
Cybersurveillance increases as it becomes cheaper.87  The cost of 
data storage has fallen precipitously since the advent of 
computers.88  One analysis indicated that the digital storage space 
that one can purchase per unit of cost has doubled roughly every 
fourteen months between 1980 and 2009.89  At the same time, the 
storage capacity of individual devices has increased; the 
maximum available disk size for a desktop computer has nearly 
doubled every eighteen months since 1980.90  Thus, governments 
are increasingly able to inexpensively and efficiently store 
information in bulk.  
Another defining feature of the Digital Age is that 
information is now a commodity to be sold and bartered.91  
Governments92 and businesses93 have entered the emergent Big 
Data94 markets.  Companies collect massive amounts of data 
87. See Drew F. Cohen, It Costs the Government Just 6.5 Cents an Hour to Spy on
You, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/nsa-
surveillance-cheap-103335 [https://perma.cc/G8NV-Q4C3].  
88. See BIG DATA AT WORK: THE DATA SCIENCE REVOLUTION AND
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 160 (Scott Tonidandel, Eden B. King, & Jose M. Cortina 
eds., 2015).   
89. Matthew Komorowski, A History of Storage Cost, MKOMO.COM (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://www.mkomo.com/cost-per-gigabyte [https://perma.cc/4WQK-KQL7]; see also 
Matthew Komorowski, A History of Storage Cost (Update), MKOMO.COM (Mar. 9, 2014), 
http://www.mkomo.com/cost-per-gigabyte-update [https://perma.cc/YDR8-R4QE].   
90. Richard Wright et al., The Significance of Storage in the “Cost of Risk” of Digital 
Preservation, 4 INT’L J. DIGITAL CURATION 104, 105 (2009). 
91. See THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFORMATION 7-8 (Vincent Mosco & Janet
Wasko eds., 1988) (“[C]omputer-communication systems . . . measure and monitor 
information transactions and permit the packaging and repackaging of information into a 
marketable commodity.”). 
92. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000) (noting that Congress found that
many states sold personal information of motor-vehicle-license applicants as a commercial 
product); JOHN PODESTA ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING 
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 22-39 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov /sites 
/default /files /docs /big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB22-
CJXG] (outlining public sector management of data). 
93.  See Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN 
(Aug. 23, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/ 
[https://perma.cc/VQ34-X72U] (noting that, by 2012, data sales was “a $300 billion-a-year 
industry”); see also Building With Big Data, ECONOMIST (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18741392 [https://perma.cc/76LQ-T28M].   
94. Big Data includes “[e]xtremely large data sets that may be analyzed
computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human 
behavior and interactions.” See Big Data, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/big_data [https://perma.cc/LM5X-RAR6]; see 
also Elena Geanina Ularu et al., Perspectives on Big Data and Big Data Analytics, 3 
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about current and potential customers.  Also, political campaigns 
collect massive amounts of information about voters in order to 
persuade them and get them to the polls.95  Many “free” services 
and bargains for consumers come at the cost of granting 
information provisions and permission to surveil.96  There is a 
vast commercial market for information and data integration.97 
There is a disorienting effect to the commodification of 
information.  Cybersurveillance captures intimate details of one’s 
life in a physical time and place.98  However, as it is integrated 
into Big Data networks, the information becomes storable, 
packagable, and transferable.  Cybersurveillance strips 
information from the physical world and injects it into a virtual 
one, decontextualized from human experience.  In its amorphous 
virtual form, data challenges many traditional legal paradigms 
such as jurisdictional boundaries and international borders.99 
Most importantly, digital technology continues to transform 
human behavior.  In Riley v. California,100 the Supreme Court 
invalidated a warrantless search of cell phone data incident to an 
arrest as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures.101  Chief Justice John 
Roberts, on behalf of the eight-justice majority, noted that mobile 
phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life 
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were 
DATABASE SYS. J. 3, 4 (2012) (outlining IBM’s four aspects of Big Data as volume, velocity, 
variety, and veracity). 
95. See David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data, 28
J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 51 (2014) (noting that since 2008 “campaigns have become increasingly 
reliant on analyzing large and detailed datasets”). 
96. See Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens 
and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 48 (2013) (citation omitted) (referencing a study 
that indicated “free internet services offer $2,600 in value . . . in exchange for [user] data”). 
97. PODESTA ET AL., supra note 92, at 43-47 (discussing the data-services sector of
the economy). 
98. See Steven I. Friedland, I Spy: Self-Cybersurveillance and the “Internet of
Things”, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1459, 1461 (2015) (citation omitted) (noting that 
cybertechnology “generate[s] personal, even intimate information”).   
99.  See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 330 (2015) 
(“These unique features of data raise important questions about which ‘here’ and ‘there’ 
matter; they call into question the normative significance of longstanding distinctions 
between what is territorial and what is extraterritorial.  Put bluntly, data is destabilizing 
territoriality doctrine.”). 
100.  134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
101.  Id. at 2494-95 (referencing U.S. CONST. amend. IV.). 
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an important feature of human anatomy.”102  The opinion 
catalogued the marvel of the modern cell phone: 
The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many 
of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen 
to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.  They could 
just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, 
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, 
televisions, maps, or newspapers.  One of the most notable 
distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their 
immense storage capacity.103 
These devices record our physical movements, our entertainment 
preferences, our access to information from the Internet, our 
associational behavior, and our communications across numerous 
digital platforms. 
In addition, people are buying more and more services 
online.104  Digital platforms provide ready access to 
entertainment, gifts, clothing, transportation, real estate, 
groceries, education, navigation, and service calls.  Digital 
footprints increasingly betray an individual’s public and 
nonpublic political, religious, and intimate activity.  All of this 
information can be the subject of cybersurveillance.  And much 
of it already is. 
Government cybersurveillance comes in different forms. 
The government’s ability to observe citizen data ranges from bulk 
data collection to an individually targeted collection.105  There is 
also a distinction between collection and review.  The government 
may collect data in bulk, store it, and then only search it as 
particular interests arise. 
The government may also surveil directly or indirectly.106  A 
102.  Id. at 2484. 
103.  Id. at 2489. 
104.  See Ruth Mantell, E-Commerce Speeds Up, Hits Record High Share of Retail 
Sales, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com 
/capitolreport /2014 /08 /15 /e-commerce-speeds-up-hits-record-high-share-of-retail-sales/ 
[https://perma.cc/4NEZ-WT9X] (charting the significant growth in e-commerce sales from 
2000 to 2014). 
105.  See RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, WE KNOW ALL ABOUT YOU: THE STORY OF 
SURVEILLANCE IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 223 (2017) (outlining a recommendation that 
government interception of information in counterterrorism investigations, “both individual 
and bulk,” should be subject to judicially approved warrants). 
106.  Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big 
Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2003).   
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warrant to collect a suspect’s email correspondence is a classic 
example of direct government cybersurveillance.107  Indirect 
government cybersurveillance refers to government collection of 
data provided by target individuals to third parties, usually in the 
context of commercial transactions.108  The Fourth Amendment 
third-party doctrine109 transforms commercially motivated data 
collection into storage for indirect government cybersurveillance.  
Therefore, all cybersurveillance—information collected due to 
government coercion, government observation, commercial 
interest, or customer convenience—becomes the potential subject 
of government cybersurveillance. 
There is also an important nexus between cybersurveillance 
and cybersecurity.  Both public and private sector Big Data 
cybersurveillance fruits become vulnerable to cybersecurity 
threats from hostile governments,110 criminal elements,111 or 
hacktivists.112  Cybersecurity’s potential failure to secure 
sensitive personal information held by the government presents 
an additional threat to the civil preserve.  
107.  See id. 
108.  Id. (“[I]ndirect government surveillance rules authorize the government to 
compel providers to conduct surveillance on the government’s behalf.”).   
109.  See supra Part IV. 
110.  Russian state interference operations designed to tilt the U.S. presidential election 
in favor of Donald Trump roiled American politics well beyond 2016.  See NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT: ASSESSING RUSSIAN 
ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS ii (2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS4K-PJMG].  I 
am also among some 22 million people whose U.S. national security clearance 
documentation, including fingerprint images, was stolen by Chinese hackers.  See Joe 
Davidson, One Year After OPM Cybertheft Hit 22 Million: Are You Safer Now?, WASH. 
POST (June 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/06/08/on 
e-year-after-opm-cybertheft-hit-22-million-are-you-safer-now/?utm_term=.c8b656ea8482  
[https://perma.cc/UV4G-64MJ].   
111.  See FINKLEA & THEOHARY, supra note 10, Summary (“Twenty-first century 
criminals increasingly rely on the Internet and advanced technologies to further their criminal 
operations . . . .  [T]hey exploit the digital world to facilitate crimes that are often technology 
driven, including identity theft, payment card fraud, and intellectual property theft.”); see 
also Tony Bradley, Cybercrime is the Modern-Day Mafia, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2015, 10:38 
AM), https://www.forbes.com /sites /tonybradley /2015 /10/16/cybercrime-is-the-modern-
day-mafia/#6b9f778e4539 [https://perma.cc/Q9E7-S8TR].
112.  See Wendy H. Wong & Peter A. Brown, E-Bandits in Global Activism: 
WikiLeaks, Anonymous, and the Politics of No One, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 1015, 1015 (2013) 
(describing “a new kind of political actor” who “engage[s] in the politics of no one via 
anonymizing Internet technologies” by means of hacking systems, stealing data, and 
disrupting systems). 
2017  CIVIL SOCIETY AND CYBERSURVEILLANCE 765 
VII. TATTOO SURVEILLANCE AND THE THREAT
TO THE CIVIL PRESERVE 
Take, for example, tattoos.  Tattoos are a widespread, 
ancient medium of human expression that dates back at least 
5,000 years.113  By one estimate, between seven and twenty 
million Americans have tattoos.114  They can signal all manners 
of identity—frivolous, amorous, ironic, artistic, sacred, patriotic, 
political, memorial, associational, ascriptive, dissenting, 
nonconformist, racist, or criminal. 
Law enforcement has a number of legitimate interests in 
tattoos.  Tattoos can play a critical role in witness 
identification.115  Tattoos are also an integral part of law 
enforcement’s anti-gang tactics.116  Gang-identification training 
based on tattoo analysis helps to identify threats to the safety of 
inmates, officers, and staff of correctional facilities.117 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has engaged the 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) to 
113.  See Christina Smith, 21st Century Tattoo Identification and Information Sharing 
Thesis 5 (Jan. 5, 2015) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Bridgewater State University) (on file with 
the College of Graduate Studies, Bridgewater State University). 
114.  George B. Palermo, The Skin and Freedom of Speech, 55 INT’L J. OFFENDER 
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 507, 507-508 (2011).  
115.  See, e.g., State v. Gallegos, 853 P.2d 160, 161 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that it was an error for the trial court to exclude a photo array of the defendant’s brother’s 
tattoos as part of his defense of mistaken identification); Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 
585, 586 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (noting that a witness identified a suspect based on a single 
photo of the defendant’s tattoo—the same tattoo the witness’ saw on the robber’s arm); see 
also HU HAN & ANIL K. JAIN, TATTOO BASED IDENTIFICATION: SKETCH TO IMAGE 
MATCHING 1-2 (2013) (citation omitted) (noting that tattoos’ use in law enforcement 
agencies has grown due to their “prevalence among the criminal section of the population 
and their saliency in visual attention”).   
116.  See JOHN ANDERSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GANG PROSECUTION 
MANUAL 5 (2009) (“[G]ang unit investigators (experts) must have hands-on street 
knowledge of jurisdictional gangs and must develop and maintain up-to-date gang records 
in the form of field interview cards, police reports, probation and parole records, court 
adjudications of prosecutorial efforts, and cataloged photographs of gang members, tattoos, 
and graffiti.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 9 (recommending that gang files should 
“include photos of gang graffiti and its location; examples of various names and symbols 
used to identify the gang; [and] photos of the various tattoos worn by individual members 
affiliated with the gang” (emphasis added)). 
117.  See Thomas R. Zackasee, Prison Gang Tattoo Recognition: A Correctional 
Officer’s Survival Guide 1 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Youngstown State 
University), http:// docshare04 .docshare. tips /files /6289 /62890056 .pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EM5X-T5PT]’. 
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develop sophisticated tattoo-recognition technology.118  Like 
other biometric technology,119 law enforcement and 
counterterrorism officials will be able to identify people based on 
physical characteristics of tattoos.120  Similarly, by using other 
mobile scanning technologies,121 the government will be able to 
integrate tattoo scanners with car mounts, pole cameras, drone 
cameras, and body cameras.122 
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the project 
seeks to go beyond use of tattoos as an identifying feature to also 
“map connections between people with similarly themed tattoos 
or make inferences about people from their tattoos (e.g. political 
ideology, religious beliefs).”123 On one hand, such analysis assists 
in identifying gang affiliations.  On the other hand, such analysis 
is vulnerable to false positives, racial profiling, and stereotyping. 
A government analysis of political ideology or religious 
beliefs of people bearing tattoos should give significant pause, 
even at a particularized, retail level.  However, a proliferation of 
118.  Aaron Mackey & Dave Maass, Tattoo Recognition Research Threatens Free 
Speech and Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 2, 2016), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/tattoo-recognition-research-threatens-free-speech-
and-privacy [https://perma.cc/5GTJ-6VEW]. .
119.  Other examples include facial recognition, digital fingerprinting, and iris scans.  
See id. 
120.  Id.  
121.  See ELSAG, 5 INDISPENSABLE WAYS AN ALPR SYSTEM REDUCES VEHICLE-
RELATED CRIMES (2017), https://cdn2.hubspot.net /hubfs /2464672 /gated-downloads 
/5_Indispensable_Ways.pdf— [https://perma.cc/QHR5-343Z].  Law enforcement agencies 
commonly use these readers for traffic and parking management, tollbooth operations, access 
control, and criminal investigations.  See id.  “ALPR cameras can capture up to 900 plates 
per minute . . . .”  Id.  Some proposed uses have generated public outcry.  See, e.g., Dash 
Coleman, Tybee Island Abandons License Plate Scanner Plans, SAVANNAH MORNING 
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2013, 1:43 PM), http://savannahnow.com /news/2013-12-02/tybee-island-
abandons-license-plate-scanner-plans [https://perma.cc/G5XU-GZC3].  However, they are 
widely used and have been highly productive.  See Mike Blake, New Police Tech Has Cops 
Scanning License Plates to Trace Criminals, REUTERS, June 27, 2015, https:// www.rt.com 
/usa / 270055- police- license- plate -scanning-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/W6KD-BS24] 
(noting that over a two-month period, Denver police analyzed 835,000 license-plate images 
leading to 17,000 hits for warrants, stolen vehicles, and other investigative leads). 
122.  The proliferation of these modes of camera surveillance threatens the civil 
preserve.  See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
29, 29 (2011) (describing drones’ threat to privacy as “just the visceral jolt society needs to 
drag privacy law into the twenty-first century”); Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, 
Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 397, 399 (2016) (discussing 
privacy issues related to vantage points of police body cameras that includes victims, 
witnesses, suspects, and private enclaves).  
123.  Mackey & Maass, supra note 118. 
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mobile and stationary tattoo readers could quickly become a 
wholesale exercise.  Big Data, government public surveillance, 
image storage, and algorithmic classification of tattooed people 
all implicate the civil preserve.124  However, existing 
constitutional law likely provides no regulation of a tattoo-
recognition program. 
Tattoos are publicly visible to the extent not covered by 
clothing.  Under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, people 
would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in tattoos 
visible to the public.125  No individual collection by the officer or 
camera’s observation of that which the person exposed to the 
public would constitute a “search” under Katz.  Presuming tattoo 
scanners deployed on car mounts, poles, and officers are in public 
places, or capture images in plain view scenarios, the government 
would not engage in any physical intrusion that would trigger the 
trespass rationale established in Jones. In effect, a tattoo-
recognition program would not be subjected to any meaningful 
Fourth Amendment regulation. 
Two less established Fourth Amendment theories could 
potentially capture a challenge to a Big Data tattoo-recognition 
program.  First, a mosaic theory approach to reasonableness could 
potentially establish constitutional limits on tattoo recognition.  
Second, there have been some cases in which the courts have 
suggested that technologies that transcend human sensory 
capacity may constitute a “search” where human vision, hearing, 
or smell might not.  For example, in Kyllo v. United States,126 the 
Court held that thermal imaging technology used to assess the 
heat in a private home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, 
notwithstanding Justice Stevens’s dissenting observation that 
“ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby 
to notice the heat emanating from [the] building.”127 Similar logic 
124.  Algorithms may perpetuate discriminatory patterns embedded in a historical 
dataset, and the inferential logic in their code may create new disparities that offend values 
of equal protection, religious freedom, or free expression.  See Anupam Chander, The Racist 
Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2017).  Poorly designed algorithms may 
generate faulty data-based inferences of guilt that lead to adverse consequences.  See 
Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1759 (2015) (“Big data programs 
may facilitate a presumption of guilt . . . .”    
125.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citing Lewis v. United States, 
385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966)); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).   
126.  533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
127.  Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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informed the analysis in Jones and the holding that GPS tracking 
of a vehicle on a public roadway that could have been surveilled 
by a human team nonetheless constituted a search.128  If the Court 
emphasized the inhumanness of Big Data analysis in determining 
the reach of the Fourth Amendment, its doctrine might expand to 
reach cybersurveillance efforts like a tattoo-recognition program. 
I am quite comfortable with the existence of a civil preserve 
that is presupposed by the American system.  I am also 
comfortable with the notion that it is a constitutional value that 
should enjoy constitutional protections.  At present, however, I 
am not comfortable with a translation of those two premises into 
constitutional legal doctrine or practice without a set of standards 
that lend themselves to principled application.  The concepts are 
too amorphous for judicial operation and therefore too susceptible 
to judicial overreach.  Therefore, there is more work to be done 
to establish the contours and limits of the civil preserve in any 
effort to establish workable constitutional safeguards to protect it. 
For the time being, we are left to apply existing constitutional law 
and seek to pass legislation addressing the unique threats posed 
to the civil preserve by the technological revolution. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, this is an essay about stakes.  A surveilled public is 
a chilled public.  Its independence from government and the 
market becomes compromised with each collection.  Civil society 
theory explains why government cybersurveillance in the Digital 
Age presents profound challenges to the system. 
We are going to see more and more situations in which 
courts and policy makers struggle to apply constitutional 
principles across technological platforms—Xfinity, Netflix, 
FitBit, OnStar, Garmin, Apple Watch, Rite Aid Wellness Plus, 
and the Internet of Things—that interact with our daily personal 
lives.  These thorny cybersurveillance issues will cut across 
traditional criminal investigations as well as counterterrorism 
investigations.  Preservation of civil society must be the lodestar 
in delimiting modern cybersurveillance. 
128.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). 
